Com o spin em alta rotação a presentear-nos com leituras e interpretações dos resultados eleitorais para todos os gostos, observo que continuamos a ser uma democracia deficitária, com cidadãos menorizados a serem exclusivamente chamados a ratificar o que os directórios partidários decidem à porta fechada. Assim se explica que muitos dos eleitos do PS e do PSD sejam ilustres desconhecidos e/ou meros caciques e que as respectivas listas tenham sido encabeçadas por péssimos candidatos – por mais que os seus correligionários nos queiram convencer do contrário. Com a honrosa excepção do Livre – não obstante o resultado das suas eleições primárias ter desagradado a direcção -, o recrutamento político continua a fazer-se em circuito fechado, e para os partidos do centrão as eleições europeias servem para pouco mais do que promover alguns boys and girls e/ou incómodos reais ou potenciais para o chefe. Infelizmente, os nossos políticos de vistas curtas não sabem fazer melhor. Por último, destaco a descida do Chega e a vitória da Iniciativa Liberal, o único partido que cresceu quer em termos absolutos quer em percentagem e, portanto, o único, para além do PS, que se pode afirmar como vencedor nestas eleições.
Arquivo de etiquetas: democracia
50 Anos de Democracia em Portugal: Aspirações e Práticas Democráticas
No ano em que se celebra o 50 aniversário do 25 de Abril de 1974, o Centro de Administração e Políticas Públicas do Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas decidiu desenvolver um projecto de investigação “com o objetivo de mapear e descrever, a partir de um nível individual, como os portugueses percebem e compreendem as principais características da democracia”.
A equipa responsável é liderada pelos Professores Pedro Fonseca (coordenação geral), Conceição Pequito (coordenação científica) e Manuel Meirinho (coordenação institucional).
São parceiros deste projecto a Comissão Comemorativa dos 50 anos do 25 de Abril e o jornal Público.
Na hora da demissão de António Costa
Naturalmente, estamos agora focados na árvore e a pensar no que se seguirá, ou seja, se o Presidente da República, que convocou os partidos e o Conselho de Estado para os próximos dias, dará espaço a uma solução interna da maioria parlamentar do PS (com que legitimidade?), ou, o que é mais provável, dissolverá a Assembleia da República – isto numa altura de discussão do Orçamento do Estado para o próximo ano. O país político estará hoje especialmente agitado, num corrupio de telefonemas e especulação sobre cenários eleitorais, e muito provavelmente passará os próximos meses a fazer listas de candidatos a deputados à porta fechada – que os cidadãos são meramente chamados a ratificar nas urnas – e a preparar e conduzir a campanha eleitoral, onde mais uma vez o foco será nas lideranças políticas, como é timbre da personalização do poder político.
Mas talvez valha a pena olhar para a floresta. Nos últimos 23 anos, o PS foi governo durante 16. Dos seus 3 Primeiros-Ministros neste período, um saiu perante o “pântano político”, outro continua numa rocambolesca relação com a Justiça e é com esta que o terceiro inicia agora uma relação cujos contornos ainda desconhecemos. A isto acrescem ainda dezenas de casos de Ministros, Secretários de Estado, adjuntos, assessores e autarcas envolvidos em diversas suspeitas de corrupção e afins. Por mais “códigos de ética e conduta” e “estratégias nacionais de combate à corrupção” que sejam formulados, é inegável que Portugal tem um problema estrutural de corrupção e descrédito das instituições políticas, o que alimenta os populismos quer à esquerda quer à direita.
Na sua classificação das formas de governo Montesquieu explica que, quanto à sua natureza, existem três: a monarquia, a república (que pode ser mais aristocrática ou mais democrática) e o despotismo. Quanto ao princípio que anima cada forma, entendendo por tal o propósito que anima o povo, o que o faz actuar, considera que a república se fundamenta na virtude (amor à pátria e dedicação à causa pública), a monarquia na honra (baseada nos privilégios e distinções) e o despotismo no medo. O autor da fórmula final da separação de poderes admirava as repúblicas, mas considerava que a virtude cívica requer um elevado padrão moral, um espírito público por parte dos cidadãos que os motive a subordinar os interesses privados ao público.
Acontece que, como salienta Chandran Kukathas a respeito da teoria política de David Hume, “Não podemos depender da benevolência ou virtude dos actores políticos se queremos que a liberdade e a segurança das possessões sejam asseguradas”, pelo que “a única solução é ter uma constituição forte cujas regras gerais mantenham os grupos de interesse e indivíduos ambiciosos em xeque. São as regras e não os indivíduos que governam que asseguram a segurança e a liberdade da sociedade.”
No fundo, ecoa Cícero e Santo Agostinho, a propósito de quem Alan Ryan afirma que “[Cícero faz] da justiça a característica definidora de uma república que é realmente uma república, e antecipa a famosa observação de Santo Agostinho de que sem justiça um estado é simplesmente um grande gangue de ladrões: um estado corrupto não é uma comunidade. Não pode haver res publica se as instituições do governo são pervertidas para servir interesses privados. (…). Boas instituições protegem o interesse comum contra a erosão por interesses privados e evitam que os conflitos de interesses privados se tornem destrutivos.”
Enquanto comunidade politicamente organizada, temos evidentes problemas éticos, que não raro desaguam em problemas legais. Estes são particularmente notórios no PS porque a sua permanência durante longos períodos no poder acaba por potenciar vícios que conduzem à captura do Estado por determinados interesses privados e à erosão do interesse público. A forma de reduzir a elevada exigência moral colocada pela virtude cívica e levar a uma revalorização da causa pública é através do desenho institucional. Como também ensina Montesquieu, “todo o homem que tem poder é levado a abusar dele” indo até onde encontra limites.
Por outras palavras, precisamos urgentemente de reformar o sistema político nas suas diversas componentes. Sobre isto, teci algumas considerações já há quatro anos no Observador. Talvez esta seja uma boa oportunidade para reflectirmos sobre o que precisamos de fazer para melhorar a qualidade da nossa democracia liberal antes que ela se degrade ainda mais.
A crítica é a alma das democracias liberais
Hoje escrevo no Observador sobre como o processo de crítica imanente é central nas democracias liberais e na competição entre estas e potências revisionistas não-democráticas, como a China e a Rússia, que visam subverter a ordem internacional liberal. Aqui fica uma passagem:
A superioridade, nas mais diversas áreas, das sociedades demo-liberais em relação às não-democráticas resulta em larga medida deste processo de crítica que opera através da liberdade de expressão, do debate público, da concorrência e da inovação, permitindo às sociedades corrigirem o seu rumo com base nas experiências passadas, mudando de forma gradual, reformista ou evolucionista, não de forma revolucionária, como frequentemente acontece em sociedades fechadas.
Um estudo empírico que contraria vários argumentos favoráveis ao populismo
Yascha Mounk e Jordan Kyle decidiram realizar um estudo com base em dados empíricos e confrontar argumentos a respeito do populismo, tendo escrito este excelente artigo que reforça aquilo que muitos, entre os quais este vosso humilde escriba, têm vindo a defender, que o populismo, de esquerda ou de direita, é uma ameaça às democracias liberais, não um correctivo. Aqui fica a conclusão:
Since populists often thrive on anger about all-too-real shortcomings—elites who really are too remote, political systems that really are shockingly corrupt—it is tempting to hope that they can help rejuvenate imperfect democracies around the world. Alas, the best evidence available suggests that, so far at least, they have done the opposite. On average, populist governments have deepened corruption, eroded individual rights, and inflicted serious damage on democratic institutions.
O declínio das democracias
Aqui fica o artigo sobre o declínio das democracias, da autoria de Gustavo Sampaio, publicado na edição de 29/03/2018 do Jornal Económico, para o qual contribuí com alguns comentários.
Liberalismo, populismo e tecnocracia
Jan-Werner Mueller, “Can Liberalism Save Itself?“:
Needless to say, technocratic rhetoric provides an excellent opening for populists, because it invites the very questions that populists are wont to ask: Where are the citizens in all this? How can there be a democracy without choices? This is how technocracy and populism can start to reinforce one another. They can seem like opposites – the intellectual versus the emotional, the rational versus the irrational. And yet each is ultimately a form of anti-pluralism.
The technocratic assertion that there is only one rational solution to a problem means that anyone who disagrees with that solution is irrational, just as the populist claim that there is only one authentic popular will means that anyone who disagrees must be a traitor to the people. Lost in the fateful technocratic-populist interplay is everything one might think of as crucial to democracy: competing arguments, an exchange of ideas, compromise. In the absence of democratic discourse, politics becomes a contest between only two options. And those committed to either side share the view that there are never any alternatives.
Democracia e autoritarismo
Hoje, no Jornal Económico, podem encontrar um excelente trabalho do Gustavo Sampaio para o qual contribuí com alguns comentários.
Populismo, demagogia e democracia
Pierre Manent, “Populist Demagogy and the Fanaticism of the Center”:
As a term, “populism” is indisputably marked with discredit and denunciation. The populist orientation is often said to have a “passionate,” “extreme,” or “irresponsible” manner and tone. But its content, too, is never credited with the characteristics of reason, moderation, and responsibility. The term “populism” denotes an orientation, a political opinion, or certain orientations or political opinions, which are discredited and denounced. What opinions, what orientations? They can vary widely, and it is possible to distinguish them according to their basic political polarity, a populism of the Left or extreme Left, and a populism of the Right or extreme Right. It is important, however, to understand that the common substantive of populism tends to prevail over these opposing qualifiers of Left and Right. Even if this effect is not desired, it at least follows from the use of the term. Jean-Luc Mélenchon is thus effectively placed in the same boat as Marine Le Pen, which displeases him greatly. (Here, despite the axiological neutrality that ought to rule political science, I cannot help but sympathize with Jean-Luc Mélenchon.) By classifying these two political leaders under the same heading, this grouping effectively clouds the political landscape to the point of rendering it incomprehensible.
We encounter, then, the following difficulty. How is it possible that a notion which seems to have become indispensable for the understanding of political debate tends rather to make it confused and indecipherable? Does this notion indicate the new reality of those who are thus labeled, or is it not rather a product of the new political intention of those who use it? If the notion of populism can cover political orientations as distant as those of Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Marine Le Pen—if it thus has the power to prevail over the opposition between the Left and the Right, and even between the extreme Left and the extreme Right—it is because powerful forces intend to reconstruct the political landscape no longer around the opposition between the Right and the Left but between populism and . . . what? We do not know yet, but since “populism” is pejorative and implies discredit, we will say “respectable” and “accredited” politics.
These powerful forces intend to reconstruct the political landscape around the opposition between populism, which we can still describe as Right or Left, and respectable politics, which can still retain its versions of Right and Left. When I speak of the intention of these powerful forces, I do not refer to any sinister plot to give new names to things that have not changed, or to any plot to deceive good citizens. The situation has doubtless already changed enough so that the effort to pit “populism” against “respectable politics” is not merely possible in theory, but already has real purchase. The ability of the Right/Left polarity to organize and describe political life is now likely much weakened.
We can, however, already remark on the difference between how the Right/Left polarity and the populist/respectable polarity see political life. The Right/Left polarity attributes an equal legitimacy to both poles. Even if each of these halves claims full political legitimacy and doubts the legitimacy and occasionally even the simple morality of its opposing half, the system itself is based on the equal legitimacy of the two halves or the two poles, with an uncertainty or a gray zone represented by the extremes (extreme Right or extreme Left), whose democratic legitimacy is always suspect. The new mode is characterized by the unequal legitimacy of the two poles or the two halves: populism as such is tendentiously illegitimate, while “respectable” politics is tendentiously the only legitimate politics.
It seems to me that we have not sufficiently noted to what extent this new mode is actually new. The distinctive feature that the democratic and liberal order used to have as its foundation was the equal legitimacy of the majority and its opposition. The new order now imposing itself more and more upon us rests on the contrast between legitimate opinions and illegitimate opinions. The point deserves to be examined further, but it already seems clear that with this transformation, we have started to pass from an order built on confrontation between equally legitimate opinions to an order relying on confrontation between legitimate opinions and illegitimate opinions, between political orthodoxy and heresy. If this were true, then we would be in the process of departing from democracy as it has thus far been known.
Em defesa da hierarquia
Vários autores, “In defence of hierarchy”:
On the other hand, the idea of a purely egalitarian world in which there are no hierarchies at all would appear to be both unrealistic and unattractive. Nobody, on reflection, would want to eliminate all hierarchies, for we all benefit from the recognition that some people are more qualified than others to perform certain roles in society. We prefer to be treated by senior surgeons not medical students, get financial advice from professionals not interns. Good and permissible hierarchies are everywhere around us.
Yet hierarchy is an unfashionable thing to defend or to praise. British government ministers denounce experts as out of tune with popular feeling; both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders built platforms on attacking Washington elites; economists are blamed for not predicting the 2008 crash; and even the best established practice of medical experts, such as childhood vaccinations, are treated with resistance and disbelief. We live in a time when no distinction is drawn between justified and useful hierarchies on the one hand, and self-interested, exploitative elites on the other.
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All of this takes on a new urgency given the turn in world politics towards a populism that often attacks establishment hierarchies while paradoxically giving authoritarian power to individuals claiming to speak for ‘the people’.
(…).
Apart from their civic importance, hierarchies can be surprisingly benign in life more broadly. Hierarchy is oppressive when it is reduced to a simple power over others. But there are also forms of hierarchy that involve power with, not over. Daoism characterises this kind of power effectively in the image of riding a horse, when sometimes you have to pull, and sometimes let go. This is not domination but negotiation. In Daoism, power is a matter of energy and competence rather than domination and authority. In this sense, a hierarchy can be empowering, not disabling.
Take the examples of good relationships between parents and children, teachers and students, or employers and employees. These work best when the person higher in the hierarchy does not use that position to dominate those lower down but to enable them to grow in their own powers.
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As well as being empowering, hierarchies should be dynamic over time. Hierarchies are often pernicious not because they distinguish between people, but because they perpetuate these distinctions even when they are no longer merited or serve a good purpose. In short, hierarchies become ossified. There might be reasons, for example, to appoint people on merit to positions of power, such as to Britain’s House of Lords. Historically, however, this has often led to people not only retaining that power when they have ceased to deserve it personally, but also passing it on to their children. All legitimate hierarchies must allow for changes over time in order for them not to lead to the unjust accumulation of power. This is built into the age-based hierarchies endorsed by Confucians, since the young will eventually rise to take on the elevated status and authority of the old.
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Paternalistic hierarchy might then benefit individual autonomy. And hierarchy has one final benefit. Although it would seem to be divisive, hierarchy can promote social harmony. Many cultures justifiably place a high value on communal harmony. This involves a shared way of life, and also sympathetic care for the quality of life of others. Excessive hierarchy works against this, creating divisions within societies. Indeed, in a sense, hierarchy always brings with it the threat of tension, since it is a condition in which one adult commands, threatens or forces another to do something, where the latter is innocent of any wrongdoing, competent to make decisions, and not impaired at the time by alcohol, temporary insanity, or the like. But the goal of preserving communal life means that hierarchy might be justifiable if – and only if – it is the least hierarchical amount required, and likely either to rebut serious discord or to foster a much greater communion. This is a minimalist justification that only ever sanctions the least amount of hierarchy necessary.
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Some of these ideas about hierarchy will no doubt be received more favourably than others. There will also be disagreement – as there is among ourselves – about whether we simply need to be clearer about the value of some hierarchies, or whether we need more of them in certain domains. Hierarchy has been historically much-abused and it is the understandable fear of being too enthusiastic about hierarchy that makes some queasy about talking about its merits. Nonetheless, we think it important to put these ideas forward as an invitation to begin a much-needed conversation about the role of hierarchy in a world that is in many ways now fundamentally egalitarian, in that it gives equal rights and dignity to all. However, it clearly does not and cannot give equal power and authority to all. If we are to square the necessary inequality that the unequal distribution of power entails with the equally necessary equality of value we place on human life, it’s time to take the merits of hierarchy seriously.
Populismo, tecnocracia e democracia liberal
Daniele Caramani, “Will vs. Reason: The Populist and Technocratic Forms of Political Representation and Their Critique to Party Government”, American Political Science Review 111, no. 1 (2017):
Populism and technocracy see themselves as antipolitics and, more specifically, antiparty. Whether in their actor (movements and parties), discourse and ideology, or regime and institutional versions, both forms of representation claim to be external to party politics. In fact, the more precise claim of these forms of representation is that they are above party politics, which is seen in negative terms for various reasons. Parties are carriers of particular interests rather than the interests of society as a whole and even pursue the interests of the “part”—as it were—to the detriment, when necessary, of the general interest. Parties, rather than being perceived as capable of formulating visions and projects for the common good of the society (albeit alternative ones), are seen merely in terms of individualistic and self-interested (ultimately irresponsible) factions that articulate particularistic interests.
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First, in both populism and technocracy there is the idea of a unitary, general, common interest of a given society (a country). In these views, there are things that are either good or bad for the whole of society and political action can be either good or bad for a society in its entirety. There is a homogenous and organic vision of the people and the nation. It is furthermore possible to “discover” this common or general interest. While populism and technocracy—as is discussed below—have fundamentally different views on how to identify the unitary interest, they are confident that it exists and can be found out.
Second, both populism and technocracy have a nonpluralistic view of society and politics. Politics is doing what is good for all, not articulating, allocating and deciding between diverse interests, or aggregating them. To be more precise, an aggregation does indeed take place. However, rather than having competing proposals of aggregation (as this is the case in parties’ ideologies) given to people to choose from, the true solution is manifest and indisputable. In this sense, both pretend to be, and present themselves as, antiideological. There are no party platforms needed (for a prospective decision) and, when and where these are available, they should not be binding. To be sure, mass political parties, too, present a unified vision of the public interest. This is precisely their function of “aggregation” of various interests from diverse constituencies. However, differently from populism and technocracy, several visions are present in the system, they compete with one another and compromise is sought—either through majority-opposition alternation over time or consensual institutions.
While party government is mainly based on a prospective “mandate” view (input counts and parties are bound to what they promise), populism and technocracy are based on a retrospective “independent” view (output counts) as they operate through vagueness rather than through a precise program or mandate. Both populism and technocracy thus follow a trustee model. In technocracy, people cannot give a mandate because they do not possess the faculty of identifying society’s interest. In populism, it could be argued that the leadership determines people’s interests through a strong identification with them (embodiment)—by being “one of them.” This can be seen as a form of mandate. Yet there is a complete transfer of decision making to the leadership that is unquestioned. Questioning the leadership is automatically questioning the will of the people. In the party government conception of democracy, on the other hand, voters are assumed to have some degree of expertise.
Third, both populism and technocracy—in their vision of a unitary society and refusal of plurality—see the relationship between people and elite as “unmediated.” All that comes in-between is a source of distortion of the general interest. As a consequence, populism and technocracy rely on an independent elite to which the people entrust the task of identifying the common interest and the appropriate solution. In spite of presenting themselves as antielite and antiestablishment, the populist model is as elitist—if not more—than party government with leaders being uncontested and unquestioned over protracted periods and enjoying vast spaces to manoeuvre and freedom to interpret people’s interest. It is no accident that populist parties—be it in the past or recently in Austria’s FPÖ, France’s National Front, Italy’s Northern League, or Britain’s UKIP among others—have lasting leaderships that are largely uncontested and based on acclamatory and plebiscitarian mobilization. In fact, both types of ideologies have often found their application in nondemocratic regimes, most notably in Latin America, be it the populist-plebiscitarian regimes or the technocratic-military regimes.
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In different ways, populism and technocracy are both antipolitical forms of representation. While politics is competition, aggregation of plurality and allocation of values, populism and technocracy see society as monolithic with a unitary interest. While populism and technocracy aim at discovering the common good, parties compete to define it. Both populism and technocracy do not conceive of a legitimate opposition insofar as that would involve conceiving of “parts” being opposed to the interest of the whole. In the case of populism, plurality is reduced to the opposition between people and elite. In the case of technocracy, plurality is reduced to the opposition between right and wrong. In the former, opposition is corrupt; in the latter it is irrational.
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For the sake of the theoretical argument, the article has presented the populist and technocratic alternatives to party government through ideal types rather than empirical cases. For sure, the technicization of political decision making is undermining democratic sovereignty and the popularization of politics and the public sphere is undermining the informed and respectful participation of citizens in favor of mob-type attitudes. However, in recent times this challenge has so far remained within the frame of the liberal democratic state. In contrast, between World War I and II many West European countries experienced a breakdown of democracy and many countries in Southern/Eastern Europe and Latin America had protracted periods during which regimes based on either or both populist and technocratic principles ruled. Today, populists mobilize as political parties themselves and participate to the electoral competition as well as national executives. Experts are co-opted by parties (often from think tanks linked to them) that rely on their expertise and delegate the task of taking unpopular decisions especially at the transnational level. There have been cases, as in Italy after the Monti cabinet of 2011−12, of experts creating political parties. By participating in elections, they offer precisely the kind of “agonistics” that legitimize the system and, when they enter government, movements and experts morph, vindicating party democracy. Populism and technocracy therefore operate as “correctives” of—not only alternatives to—party government.
São os referendos bons para a democracia?
AC Grayling, “Are referendums good for democracy?”:
If you live in a small ancient Greek city with restrictions on who can take part in the political process, referendums are pretty well your only governmental decision-making resource.
But if you live in a populous, diverse and complex society, you do far better to avoid referendums, and instead to devise a representative democracy in which people are elected to act on the populace’s behalf by getting information, deliberating, discussing, listening to different points of view, making sober judgments, and acting on them wisely. If the representatives succeed in this, their electors might keep them in post. If they do not, their electors can throw them out.
There are two great advantages of the representative system. When combined with all the shortcomings of referendums, they show why the vote on 23rd June 2016 was such a farce. Regrettably, with MPs having voted in favour of triggering Article 50 on Wednesday night, the result is now very likely indeed to be acted upon.
The first such advantage is that the representative system allows the rest of us to get on with our lives, jobs and families without having to think about the minutiae of such things as legislation on health and safety in the gas industry, or amendments to §5(c)(ii) paragraph eight of the Heathlands and Waterways (Protected Fowl) Act of 1953. Much in the business of legislating involves equal quantities of boredom and expertise, each a great barrier to agora-style approaches to democracy, and they are peculiarly unfitted for them therefore.
The other advantage is that representative democracy is indirect democracy. The ignorance, self-interest, short-termism, emotion, prejudice and occasional knuckle-headedness of which almost all of us are capable are—or in the ideal should be—filtered out by the institutions and procedures of representative democracy, which are designed specifically for that purpose, and which accordingly allow mature intelligence to be focused on the business of government. Party politics interferes with this desirable arrangement, of course, and the result is not only that partisan interests and knuckle-headedness too often fail to get filtered out, but the very institutions and practices that exist to minimise such failure can be manipulated. But the system works often enough, at least for less contentious matters, and that is a good thing.
Referendums are in general inconsistent with this process. They bypass the institutions and procedures designed to optimise decision-making, and go straight for the opposite, posing a simplified question inviting a yes-no answer to a body of people among whom very few have given the matter much thought, or thought anything like informed and dispassionately enough. In handing decision-making over to a referendum, politicians thereby abdicate responsibility, and there is little guarantee that the outcome will be the most considered possible alternative.